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Introduction 
Galileo, bound, is led to a chamber where he is shown the machinery of torture 
his inquisitors have at their disposal- wheels, racks, screws, caldrons boiling 
with acrid substances, branding irons, pincers, chains. In similar rooms across 
Europe, tens of thousands of men, women, and children have already died after 
hours or even days of unimaginable pain. The inquisitors are all but omnipotent, 
and Galileo, seventy years old, is virtually alone. At the sight of naked power 
spread before him, his will to truth is broken. Kneeling, he repudiates his life's 
work. 
Truth, we are told, triumphs. Science emerges victorious over superstition. 
Power is checked by reason. And now, from the vantage point of modernity, we 
may look back and condemn the inquisitorial oppressors, regret Galileo's 
weakness, and solemnly reaffirm the moral of the tale - truth and power are 
mortal enemies, and vigilance is necessary if truth is to prevail. 
But is that so? Michel Foucault, for one, suggests that it is not. His work 
directly contradicts the old and venerated idea that power and knowledge stand 
fundamentally opposed. Power and knowledge are mutually supporting, he 
claims, and must be analyzed in the complexity of their interrelations. To that 
end, he introduces his analytic notion "power-knowledge." 
Foucault's "power-knowledge" is a controversial concept. Brought into 
English-speaking theoretical circles less than two decades ago, its meaning and 
range of applicability are still in dispute. While no one denies that some fields 
of social scientific knowledge (such as criminology) intersect institutionally with 
mechanisms of power, these intersections do not seem, to many, to constitute 
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any essential relation of "mutual reinforcement" between knowledge and power. 
If, in rare cases, politics and scientific research are admitted to be mutually 
constitutive, the results of their mingling are typically dismissed as propaganda 
or pseudo-science. A few thinkers are willing to allow the entirety of the human 
or social sciences to be dismissed in this way-thus leaving intact and untainted 
science, real science. 
In the remainder of this essay, I will argue that at least one indisputably real 
science, biology, is analyzable as a series of structures of power-knowledge. I 
will contend that the science of life was both required and enabled by networks 
of power operating at the end of the eighteenth century. Further, once 
established as a distinct and reputable discipline, biology went on to create its 
own objects of knowledge whose management its researches were designed to 
perfect. One of those objects was race; much of nineteenth century biological 
research was aimed at categorizing what we would now call human phenotypes 
for the expressed purpose of managing and manipulating the current and future 
populations of the globe. Though some of this work can be dismissed as pseudo-
science, much of it cannot. It was, quite simply, science. And it was, quite 
simply, completely entangled in the production of racist social structures. 
Biological science invented the concept of race as we know it today and so made 
possible the development of racial hierarchies in Western societies. Thus, 
natural scientific knowledge and power are not mortal enemies; they are partners. 
Relations between power and knowledge: discipline 
According to the modern account, Galileo was temporarily silenced by the 
Inquisition. His books were banned. His freedom of movement was restricted. 
Power acted as a limit on thought and deed, an agency of repression, a 
prohibition, a no. Many people believe that that is all power ever is, that power 
is always negative and never positively productive. But, in order to maintain 
that conception of power, one must make some very dubious distinctions. For 
example, one must draw a distinction between the forces of creativity and 
repression and reserve the name "power" for the latter alone, despite their 
obvious similarities. Further, one must insist that scientific activity is simply 
systematic discovery, not any kind offorce at all. Since science discovers the 
truths that power would repress, on this view, science and power are 
oppositional; since science's objects are the creations of natural forces, science 
is not creative in itself. Thus one must posit a distinction between science, on 
the one hand, and art and humanistic pursuits, on the other, and also between 
science and technological creation. 
Foucault does not leave this neat set of categories, oppositions, and 
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distinctions intact; he exposes it as arbitrary. There are repressive forces and 
creative forces, but both are forces, powers, and they are interlocked; production 
represses, and repression produces. There is no pure form of discovery distinct 
from the power to repress or to create. Thus Foucault rejects this common, but 
dubious, account of power and proposes a different, more inclusive 
characterization of it. Power is not to be understood as a commodity the 
possession of which enables one person to repress another. Power is something 
that happens between people; it exists only in its exercise. Rather than 
something, power is better understood as a multiplicity of relations that 
constitute their own organizations; as the support these relations give each other, 
which enables the formation of networks or systems; as strategies "whose 
general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, 
in the formulation oflaw, in the various local hegemonies,"(Foucault, 1978, 92-
93) but whose origins do not lie there. In other words, power is relation, events 
of relating, whose repetition genemtes organizational networks of force-events, 
within which relatively stable institutions, objects, personalities, etc., may 
sometimes form. Thus, on Foucault's view, power relations are productive as 
well as repressive. They are productive of institutions, laws and prohibitions, 
but they are also productive of theories, ideas, pmctices, methods, beliefs, ways 
of behaving, ways of being who we are. Power is event, and within networks of 
repeating events, truths are formed. 
If we accept Foucault's conception of power, the next question is exactly how 
and to what extent does scientific practice interact with it. We must be slow to 
make generalizations, but we can get some sense of ways in which power and 
knowledge might internet by looking at regional studies of disciplines. One such 
study is Foucault's account of criminology in Discipline and Punish, where he 
describes the creation of a human type, the delinquent, within the interplay of 
knowledge and power. This study is particularly instructive for my purpose 
here, for, as we will see, the discipline of biology also produced various human 
types - races, categories generated, like the category of delinquency, from sets 
of developmental norms. In preparation for my analysis of the creation of race 
and racial theory in biological science, therefore, I will offer an overview of 
Foucault's account of delinquency's creation in and through the science of 
criminology. 
Criminology, a field of knowledge, intersects with judicial and penal exercise 
of power. Contmry to those who hold that knowledge and power are enemies, 
this intersection is not mere coexistence. Rather, Foucault claims, knowledge 
and power are "entangled."' He goes so far as to assert: 
[that] power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because 
it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and 
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knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation 
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any 
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power 
relations. (Foucault, 1977, 27) 
It is not just that criminologists and penal authorities happen to focus attention 
on the same people. Criminologists and penal authorities make each others' jobs 
possible. Knowledge extends the domains within which power-events can repeat 
themselves and produce effects; correlatively, power creates new objects of 
knowledge. This occurs in the carceral field through the dual processes of 
surveillance and normalization. 
At the end of the eighteenth century, when imprisonment became the primary 
mode of punishment, surveillance as a technique of control was carried on within 
prison walls. At first its official purpose was only to help maintain order while 
the offenders did their penance, since the point of penitentiaries was, ostensibly 
at least, to give offenders occasion to reflect on their crimes, reflection 
supposedly leading to reform. But surveillance quickly gave rise to more 
interventionist mechanisms of reform. It made possible the rewarding or 
punishing of individuals for acts committed in prison, and, combined with the 
prison dossier, it made possible the modulation of sentences based on "good 
behavior" or its opposite. Thus, imprisonment and surveillance produced data, 
which could be turned into knowledge, which in tum enabled the extension of 
techniques of control. In this domain, knowledge and power are interdependent 
in that their conditions of extension include one another. 
Foucault goes on, however, to make the more radical claim that not only are 
knowledge and power here reciprocally conditioned, but they are mutually 
constitutive. (Foucault, 1977, 183) To see his reasoning, we tum to his analysis 
of normalization. 
The role norms play in structured processes of reformation is much the same 
as the role they play in medicine and pedagogy. By studying the dossiers of 
prisoners passing through a reformatory regime, scientists can generate norms 
and then classify prisoners according to their deviations from those norms. This 
is what Foucault calls "normalization." 
Normalization does two things: It homogenizes, and it individualizes. Norms 
homogenize by enabling all difference to be understood and treated as deviation 
from the norm and therefore as essentially related to it. Everyone caught up in 
a normalizing system stands in some relation to the norm, for there is no outside 
to the classificatory system. At the same time, norms individualize, because they 
enable a precise characterization of each person who is to be classified. Exactly 
who a person is can be known by the intersection of all his or her deviations 
from relevant norms. One's individuality, then, is just the full set of one's 
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deviations. 
Once normalizing power produces the classification systems needed to isolate 
something like a "dangerous individual" (Foucault, 1977, 252), the intersection 
of a particular set of deviations, the delinquent is born. The delinquent is a type 
of self who exists "before the crime and even outside it" (Ibid.) much as a 
homosexual can be said to exist in the absence of any homosexual experience.2 
At a given time, the delinquent may already be guilty of crime, or he or she may 
simply have a latent predisposition toward it. Whichever, what the criminal 
justice system must address is not only or even primarily the acts the delinquent 
commits but rather this individual's tendency to commit illegal acts; what must 
be addressed is the individual him or herself. All kinds of intrusions into 
people's lives then justified on the basis of the fact that a family member, say, is 
a delinquent personality "at risk" for delinquent behaviors (such as drug abuse). 
Family members and others surrounding the latent delinquent can be disciplined 
to respond to him or her and to each other in prescribed ways to "manage" the 
risk of overt manifestation of delinquency. In the process, lives are shaped; 
simultaneously, more data are gathered and concepts and techniques for 
identification and management are refined. The interdependent extension of 
power and knowledge continues, justified now by the figure of the delinquent, 
a category constituted within a regime of power and its correlative knowledge 
system. 
Delinquency, as an object of knowledge, is produced, Foucault claims, by the 
carceral system. It is an epistemic object that is the product of the exercise of a 
certain form of power. Thus, power is in fact constitutive of knowledge, at least 
where criminology is concerned. Further, since penal institutions (along with the 
carceral system more generally) exercise power in relation to delinquent 
individuals, knowledge of such individuals is essential for the system's 
functioning. Power could not be exercised- which means it could not exist-in 
the absence of such knowledge. Therefore, just as power is constitutive of 
knowledge, knowledge is constitutive of power. In the discipline of 
criminology, Foucault shows us, knowledge and power are completely 
interdependent. But is the same true in real science? 
The rest of this essay is concerned with showing how the concept power-
knowledge can be applied to analysis of biology. I will draw on an early work, 
The Order of Things, to characterize biological science in its incipience. I will 
argue that the scientific debate over the origin and classification of variant 
human morphologies actually produced the;: epistemic object race and was 
instrumental in establishing nineteenth century racisms; This process of 
epistemic production parallels the production of delinquency in significant ways 
and serves similar purposes, such as the management and discipline of 
populations. 
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The origins of biological science 
Biology is the study of life. Its predecessor, natural history, is the study of the 
orders of natural beings. It is a mistake, Foucault contends, to see the former as 
a simple outgrowth of the latter. He writes, 
Historians want to write histories of biology in the eighteenth century; but 
they do not realize that biology did not exist then, and that the pattern of 
knowledge that has been familiar to us for a hundred and fifty years is not 
valid for a previous period. And that, if biology was unknown, there was 
a very simple reason for it: life itself did not exist. All that existed was 
living beings, which were viewed through a grid of knowledge constituted 
by natural history. (Foucault, 1970, 127-8) 
Foucault sees an epistemic break between natural history and biology, a break 
that can only be understood upon examination of the broader epistemic grids that 
existed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Natural history is to be 
understood against the background of the "classical episteme," wherein 
knowledge consists of tables of identities and differences. This way of 
understanding the world precludes any concept of"life," because a tabular notion . 
of reality insists that nature is perfectly continuous, whereas "life" names a 
qualitative leap in the order ofthings.3 
Foucault locates this major epistemic break just at the end of the eighteenth 
century. If that is plausible, it is no surprise that the word "biology" was not 
introduced into scientific discourse until1802.4 Biology, the science oflife, was 
not possible until the category "life" had been formulated, a formulation 
inextricably bound up with notions of temporality, mortality, limit, sequential 
change. These are the ordering principles of a new episteme, one that does not 
view the natural world as a static, continuous tabular plane. Biology is 
essentially the study of processes and functional norms. It is a science wherein 
human being is primarily 
a being possessing functions - receiving stimuli ... reacting to them, 
adapting himself, evolving, submitting to the demands of an environment, 
coming to terms with the modifications it imposes, seeking to erase 
imbalances, acting in accordance with regularities, having, in short, 
conditions of existence and the possibility of finding average norms of 
adjustment which permit him to perform his functions. (Foucault, 1970, 
357, Foucault's italics) 
Although Foucault wrote the above words years before he began studying 
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normalizing power, biology appears here in its similarity with psychology, 
criminology, and other disciplines whose aim is to discover the norms of 
function and development of a given type of being within a given context. What 
remains is to examine how specific developments within biological knowledge 
are related to developments in power. 
Biology and bio-power 
Concurrent with the rise of biology, at the tum of the nineteenth century, 
Foucault contends, disciplinary power was developing its techniques of 
normalization. Normalizing disciplinary power is a positive force; it is the 
power to posit, to shape, to cultivate, to create. Any limits it imposes are in the 
service of production and growth. Its primary concern is the generation, 
maintenance, and management ofliving human subjects. It is preeminently an 
administrative power. 
The old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully 
supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management 
of life. During the classical period, there was a rapid development of 
various disciplines- universities, secondary schools, barracks, workshops; 
there was also the emergence, in the field of political practices and 
economic observation, of the problems of birthrate, longevity, public health, 
housing, and migration. Hence there was an explosion of numerous and 
diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control 
of populations, marking the beginning of an era of "bio-power." (Foucault, 
1978, 139-40) 
Effective management strategies presuppose knowledge of the objects to be 
managed. If the goal is to manage birthrates, longevity, health, and migration-
processes- it is important to understand the physiological processes of human 
beings. Thus, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, a science of such 
processes, a science of something like life, was imperative; biological knowledge 
was absolutely essential for the effective exercise of disciplinary power. 
Along with the emergence of this administrative imperative to manage the 
physiological functions of populations, the concept of life as physical, material 
organic finitude arose as a viable epistemic category. A science of life not only 
became necessary but also became for the first time possible, since its condition 
of possibility, the object "life," had been marked out within a field of power 
relations. Hence, biology is not only a necessary tool for disciplinary power; the 
very possibility of a science ofbiology is actually constituted by that power. 
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As a normalizing discipline, then, biology is an arm of bio-power. Once 
constituted and legitimated, biology aided (and still aids) the extension ofbio-
power in numerous ways. In the last century, one prominent way was the 
production of the population management tool, race. 
Before the nineteenth century, the word "race," in both English and French, 
meant "lineage." To be a member of a race was to have a certain heritage; it was 
a matter of descent, though it was not yet linked to anything like a "genetic 
heritage."5 One could speak of the Greek race, the Jewish race, the Russian race, 
or even races of animals such as the Dalmatian race of dogs. Though race might 
incidentally correlate with morphology, its primary sense was that of breeding; 
it had some of the same connotations that the word "breeding" has in common 
English usage -designating both one's parentage and one's manners. 
The term "race" was not reserved for human phenotypic variety until the 
nineteenth century. It is only during that period that race and racism as we know 
them today came to be. That fact is not obvious now mainly because we are 
used to understanding slavery as a product of racism, which means racism must 
have existed prior to the nineteenth century. However, as I will show, racism is 
an effect, not a cause, of slavery. 
Prior to the nineteenth century, during the European expansion into Africa and 
the Americas, justification for conquest and slavery did not come from racial 
theory but rather from theology; the operative distinction between Europeans and 
others was religious: "we" are Christian; "they" are pagan.6 By the late 
eighteenth century, though, the large and growing number of slaves who 
converted to Christianity posed a problem for their owners; the requisite 
emancipation would constitute a serious financial loss and would produce a free 
and perhaps unmanageable underclass in colonial territories. A new, non-
theological justification for slavery was needed. 
Until that time slavery was not linked to skin color or body form as race is. 
What we now call "white slavery" was common in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries when many Slavs were sold in markets in Italy, Spain, Egypt, and the 
Mediterranean islands. It was not until 1793, when the expansion of Russia, 
culminating in the annexation of the Crimea, cut off the supply of white slaves 
to Islamic markets, that "black" could become synonymous with "slave."7 Only 
then could morphology possibly be taken as the basis for slavery's justification. 
That possibility was realized through the creation of sciences of race within the 
new discipline of biology. 
In 1799, Louis Francois Jauffret founded the Societe des Observateurs de 
!'Homme. (Stocking, 15). Its members were to observe various groups of human 
beings and study the gradations in those groups from primitivity to modernity. 
(Stocking, 27) The Societe called for classification of human groups based on 
comparative anatomy, comparative study of customs, construction of a typology 
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of France to detennine the influence of climate on body fonn and habit, founding 
of a museum of comparative ethnography, and compilation of a comparative 
dictionary of all known languages. (Stocking, 16) The discipline we now call 
anthropology thus emerged as a subfield within the life sciences. It had two 
goals: to establish a classificatory system and to establish a hierarchy of 
development among the world's human groups. 
Societe members sailed to Africa, Tasmania, and New Holland (now 
Australia) in early 1800 in order to observe those regions' aboriginal peoples.8 
Others continued the work that the Societe began; later observers concentrated 
on various types of somatometry, with head-fonn becoming the main 
morphological trait studied, in part because of the possibility of comparisons 
between the skulls ofliving and pre-historic people. At first the study of head-
fonn was undertaken in order to prove either polygeny (the view that humanity 
is a set of species with separate origins) or its opposite, monogeny.9 But as the 
century progressed, the question of whether Homo sapiens was one or several 
species gave way to the questions of how many races there were and how best 
to characterize them. Race became the preeminent object ofbio-anthropological 
study. 
Before we examine how the object race came into being, it is important to 
emphasize that Jauffret and his colleagues and successors were natural, not social 
scientists. What we would now call physical anthropology was part of biology, 
and its practitioners were anatomists, physiologists, zoologists, and medical 
doctors. Though anthropology became a separate department in many American 
universities between 1890 and 1910, until it ceased attributing most significant 
human variations to hereditary factors, it could not function as a discipline 
theoretically and methodologically separate from biology. It did not develop 
genuinely distinct theories and methods until the 1920s. During the period under 
consideration here, the theories and methods of anthropology were completely 
consistent with the theories and methods of other branches of biological science. 
Exactly how type or race became an object of study at the same time that 
scientists were emphasizing temporal organic processes is difficult at first to 
understand; on the surface, the predominance of typology seems in direct 
conflict with biology's emphasis on function and process; the establishment of 
static identities seems in direct conflict with biology's emphasis on change 
through time. The key to understanding lies in the fact that nineteenth century 
scientists, from the very beginning of biological study, were interested in the 
history of human development. Developmental thinking, far from precluding 
typologies, made them all the more important, because development was seen 
to occur in stages. For example, the fact that a human being develops from a 
cluster of cells quite unlike any living person led biologists to see bodies as the 
culmination of a process that they might understand through study of the stages 
181 
of fetal development. While stages are of course merely transient formations in 
process, biologists tended to conceive of them as discrete- and static- moments 
in a developmental chain. 
Thus, stages were easily construed as types; and, conversely, types, the 
morphological variations biologists observed, must be stages. If those stages 
could be isolated and studied, then perhaps the full process could be delineated. 
While this seems harmless enough in relation to comparative anatomical studies 
of dead fetuses, we must remember that the larger project was that of describing 
the development of human civilization. Adult "types" - races in particular-
were believed to be stages - arrested and permanent, perhaps, but stages - that 
could serve as clues to the mystery of human development. 10 Thus was biology 
a major force in the creation of the concept of race as graded type. Superior and 
inferior human types - races - became facts. Biology then set out to take 
account of those facts. Data on morphological groups were amassed and norms 
of development were established. Races were ranked according to how civilized 
(or uncivilized) their representatives were thought to be. 
By 1850, the anatomist Robert Knox could argue successfully that races were 
the result of arrested or deviant development; race occurred when there was a 
retardation of normal developmental processes. (Knox thought Saxons were the 
only people who were not retarded; all other groups exhibited some form of 
developmental deviation.)11 By Knox's time developmental thinking was deeply 
rooted in natural science. Typology was no longer a matter of classification as 
it had been in natural history. Type was a function of normalization, and the 
variations characteristic of types were deviations from norms. Though many 
people disagreed with Knox's particular racial hierarchy, his framework for 
understanding race- that it had to do with normed development- was perfectly 
consistent with the science of his time. 12 
Once race (meaning those morphologies that differ from the Saxons, or 
whichever group puts itself at the top) came to be understood as deviation, the 
old concept of degeneration found its way back into natural science. In times 
past, degeneration was connected to the metaphysical notion of a Great Chain of 
Being emanating from a divine source; beings further from the source were more 
degenerate than those closer. But degeneration's theological origins became 
irrelevant as the concept's medical and social utility became apparent for the 
management of populations. 
A degenerate individual was defined as one who failed to advance 
appropriately along normal physical, mental, and moral developmental lines. 
Since degeneracy was believed heritable and progressive, steps had to be taken 
to control those individuals and groups who exhibited any symptoms of it. 
Many people judged degenerate were prohibited by law from marrying; those 
judged likely to propagate outside of marriage (namely, the criminal, feeble-
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minded, and insane) were sterilized. Race itself was a mark of degeneracy, so 
entire races were judged more or less degenerate based on the marks of race 
alone. However, scientists usually found plenty of other marks of degeneracy 
in those whose race indicated its presence as well. For example, the U.S. 
medical establishment "confirmed," using faulty data from the eighth, ninth, and 
tenth census, that the Negro race was dying out due to "physical 
degeneracy."(Gilman, 39) It was only a matter of time before that race destroyed 
itself. Other signs of degeneracy, insanity and perversion, supposedly increased 
by 1000% in African-Americans between 1860 and 1890. Some of this increase 
was thought to be due to the sexual freedom that emancipation supposedly 
brought, but unrestrained sexuality, scientists believed, would only cause further 
degeneration of the race. The only outcomes possible were mass sterility or 
mass insanity, (Gilman, 39) the preludes to natural racial annihilation. 
Since degeneracy is just another name for deviation from developmental 
norms, and since criminality is one type of deviation from those norms, 
degeneracy supposedly included and produced an increase in criminality. (At 
this point biology and criminology were interlocked.) While awaiting the natural 
final solution, white Americans and Europeans had to be vigilant lest the 
criminal tendencies of inferior races lead to the injury, and the corruption, of 
their own. Management of racially-marked criminal populations was necessary; 
fortunately, criminals bearing the marks of race were relatively easily managed, 
since surveillance was relatively easy. 
Because degenerates (of all sorts) were deemed to be doomed anyway, many 
scientists believed it was morally permissible to use them as experimental 
subjects, even if such use endangered their health or their very lives. Thus were 
members of allegedly degenerate races, as well as mental patients and 
homosexuals, used as test subjects. In one infamous case, scientists injected 
African-American subjects with syphilis and allowed them to become terminally 
ill; they considered this permissible because, they claimed, degenerate Negroes 
would have contracted syphilis anyway. (Gilman, 45) 
With the publication of Hereditary Genius in 1869, Francis Galton 
inaugurated the eugenics movement, a bio-political movement that flourished in 
Europe and Japan as well as in America into the 1930s. Historians credit this 
movement with racist anti-immigration laws in the United States and Europe and 
with the forced sterilization of thousands of people. The purpose of the 
movement was to rid humanity of so-called defects, deviations from the norms 
of biological and social function established by scientific research. These norms 
- having been established by the same sciences that produced the episternic 
object race- inevitably followed racial lines and, hence, were inevitably racist. 
Thus, biology created the conditions for the possibility of racism. While 
many people dislike associating with those whose customs, religious beliefs, or 
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political views differ from their own, are disturbed by what is unfamiliar, and 
feel challenged in unpleasant ways by people whose behavior they find difficult 
to predict, there is no necessity that these feelings of discomfort, dislike, or fear 
should develop into racism. For that to happen, it was first necessary to invent 
the concept of race as a way of categorizing and naming difference. Since races 
were conceived within biology as stages along a developmental continuum, they 
were hierarchized from their inception. Thus, differential treatment of members 
of "inferior races," whether punitive or condescending, was a possibility created 
by scientific discourse, a possibility whose realization was inevitable. 
Conclusions 
Just as power-knowledge gave rise to the epistemic object delinquency and then 
used that object to extend the grasp of power, biological science (generously 
funded by governments intent on gaining socially useful knowledge for the 
efficient management of life) produced the epistemic object race and then, using 
it as justification, participated. in the extension of power through the racial 
management of populations and individuals. The concept of race was very 
useful. It justified slavery. It justified hundreds of wars. It kept apart 
underclasses who might have joined together against the classes that ruled them. 
And, of course, it ~erved for decades as an object of well-funded study for many 
scientists. 
Of course, that was the past. Now, though racism is far from declining in the 
West, the biological concept of race is in disfavor. Genetic theory posits gene 
pools and populations as its objects of analysis, objects to which morphological 
races do not correspond; anthropologists now speak of ethnic groups. Therefore, 
some would argue, since scientific theory and racist practice are separable, 
science cannot have been responsible for racism. The flaws in this argument are 
too obvious to require enumeration, but it does point to an interesting 
phenomenon. In fact, scientific texts and theories do seem to be abandoning the 
concept of race and doing so at exactly the same time that racial minorities are 
using the concept as a rallying point for political action on their own behalf. 13 
Perhaps the concept of race has outlived its usefulness as a population 
management tool and now poses more of a danger to the status quo than it 
obviates. At the end of Discipline and Punish, Foucault advances a similar 
speculation about the concept of delinquency; he suggests that the management 
of populations may no longer require the figure of the delinquent, who may be 
replaced with some other form of discipline or object of knowledge. (One might 
argue that in major American cities, delinquent populations, like racial 
populations, now pose a threat to the powers that posited them and so may have 
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to be dismantled if those networks of power are to maintain themselves.) In any 
case, one should be very cautious about assuming that science is more 
"progressive" than society and very circumspect about the managerial intentions 
embedded in any new theory of human variation or development. Despite the 
stories illustrating the contrary, power and knowledge are intertwined. Even 
Galileo did not contemplate the heavens with apolitical objectivity; he worked 
in an arsenal in Venice. 14 
If my analysis is plausible, then Foucault's notion of power-knowledge is a 
useful analytic tool for application to at least one of the natural sciences. Those 
who would argue that sciences like biology are fields of knowledge only 
externally related to power are mistaken. Power permeates and shapes biology 
in ways very similar to the ways in which it permeates and shapes criminology, 
psychiatry, pedagogy, and industrial psychology. It created the conditions for 
biological science to come into existence when it created the category "life." 
Biology, like criminology, generates new epistemic objects, such as race, which 
it then claims the right to observe. Through extended obserVation it establishes 
norms of development and functioning; based on those norms it allows and 
sometimes even arranges for the management of deviation. Therefore biology, 
like the fields of knowledge Foucault studies in Discipline and Punish, is a 
normalizing discipline that arises within and extends bio-power. 
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I. Foucault (1977), p. 23. 
2. For a discussion of the homosexual as a type of self, see Foucault (1978), 
p. 43. 
3. The old Natural Historians believed all natural beings are locatable on 
one conceptual plane or table. Their tenet was "nature never leaps." 
4. Stepan, Nancy (1982), The Idea of Race in Science, Macmillan, London, 
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11, 1990. Davis goes on to say that racial slavery seems to have been a 
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the English word "slave" derives from the name of a Slavic people 
enslaved in southeastern Europe. 
8. Stocking gives a fairly detailed account of the expedition. "Observation" 
actually involved by a great deal of interference, including sexual assault 
and rape of native women. Within thirty years after the Tasmanians were 
"observed" by European scientists, they became extinct. This lent 
credence to the longstanding view that Tasmanians were the lowest race 
on the ladder of civilization. 
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9. Stepan, pp. 9-10. Joseph Camper seems to have started this, and 
Blumenbach tried to counter his work. Eventually craniometry was 
standardized with Retzius' development of the cephalic index in 1860. 
There were attempts to develop measures of skin color, but some, like 
A.L. Kroeber, objected that this could never be precise. The nasal index 
was also a popular measurement. See Snyder, pp. 14-17. Etienne Serres 
argued early in the nineteenth century that Africans are more primitive 
than Europeans because the distance their navels and penises 
(presumably only those of the males) remains shorter relative to body 
weight throughout life. See Gilman, p. 41, or Gould, p. 40. Craniometry 
was not fully discredited until Franz Boas' 1911 article showing that head 
shape varied with environment rather than being fixed by heredity; Boas 
also showed that stature varied with nutrition. Somatometry was largely 
replaced in the twentieth century by intelligence testing, but there are a 
few current attempts to revitalize it. Psychologist J.P. Rushton has 
argued recently that brain weight is an indicator of intelligence and that 
blacks and women of all races, having lighter brains than white males, 
are in fact less intelligent. See Rushton, "Race differences in behaviour: 
a review and evolutionary analysis," Personality and Individual 
Differences, 9:1035-40. For a discussion of Rushton, see Cemovsky, z. 
Z., "Race and Brain Weight: A Note on J.P. Rushton's Conclusions," 
Psychological Reports, (1990), vol. 66, pp. 337-8, and Rushton's reply 
immediately following on pages 339-66. Cemovsky responds in 
"Intelligence and Race: Further Comments on J.P. Rushton's Work," 
Psychological Reports, (1991), vol. 68, pp. 481-2. 
10. The change in the meaning of the term "race" in both French and English 
was clearly enabled by and reflected in the work of natural historians and 
biologists. Cuvier conflates the notion of type and lineage as early as 
1817 in The Animal Kingdom. There he groups together beings with 
distinct similarities, thus positing types, some of which are also groups 
of beings with similar lineages. The notion of type, then, seems 
consistent with the older notion of lineage, despite the fact that it is not. 
See Banton, 51-2. Cuvier, of course, was not interested in suggesting 
that types are stages on a developmental continuum (since he feared such 
thinking would lead to the heresy of evolutionism), but his rival 
Geoffroy, who believed that God has only one (or a very few) 
architectural designs which he varies to produce species, was interested 
in just such a possibility. See Appel, T. A. (1987) The Cuvier-Geoffroy 
Debate: French Biology in the Decades Before Darwin, Oxford 
University Press, New York, for an account of these thinkers' work. That 
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developmental thinking led to the formulation of type as arrested stage 
is evident in Geoffroy's science of teratology, the study of monsters. Just 
as species might be seen as various stages of development of one divine 
organic architectural design, deformed individuals might be seen as the 
unfortunate results of arrested or disrupted development within one 
species. William Ripley -usually considered now as nothing more than 
a circus side-show aficionado - was a serious teratologist and a student 
of race. Along with many of his contemporaries, he thought racial types 
-like congenitally deformed individuals -represented arrested stages of 
development on one hierarchical continuum. 
11. Stepan, pp. 41-44. I would like to note that this conception of race may 
account for the phenomenon often mentioned by those who charge white 
feminist and leftist theorists with racism. White theorists often treat non-
white people as having a race, whereas they themselves are "race-less." 
If my claims about what race is are right, then in fact those white 
theorists are raceless, and their racelessness is one aspect of racism. 
12. The OED lists R. Knox as the author of an 1831 article in Coquet's 
Anatomy that uses the word "organic" in its modem bio-chemical sense. 
I have not been able to confirm that R. Knox and Robert Knox are the 
same man, but Robert Knox was at the height of his anatomical career in 
1831, when the article came out. If Robert Knox is R. Knox, then there 
is a direct and interesting link in England between the solidification of 
the dividing line between organic and inorganic structure, on the one 
hand, and normalizing thinking, on the other. See Gillispie, C. C. (ed.), 
(1973), Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Vol. VII, Charles Scribner's 
Sons, New York, pp. 414-16. 
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1990), vol. 52, no. 8, pp. 504-6, and Littlefield, A., Lieberman, L., and 
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1982), pp. 641-55. 
14. See Harding, p. 30. 
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